delvingbitcoin
Hybrid Jamming Mitigation: Results and Updates
Posted on: September 17, 2024 17:37 UTC
The discussion raises critical concerns about the role of downstream nodes in the resolution of Hashed Time-Locked Contracts (HTLCs), particularly in the context of the reputation system described in the provided original document.
It highlights a fundamental issue where the responsibility for the preimage release and, consequently, the delayed resolution of HTLCs falls on the downstream nodes. This situation becomes problematic when considering the dynamics within a specific sub-route .. <-> B <-> C <-> D <-> ..
, where node C's forwarding decision relies heavily on node B's endorsement of the HTLC, despite B's limited capability to ensure or even influence the timely resolution of the HTLC by downstream nodes such as D.
The core of the problem lies in the fact that B, while being a forwarding hop, does not have knowledge of D's identity and thus cannot factor in D's behavior or reliability when endorsing an HTLC. This lack of control and information significantly hinders B's ability to make an informed endorsement, challenging the entire premise of using endorsements as a means to gauge the likelihood of prompt HTLC resolution. The assumption is that an endorsement implies a recommendation for downstream nodes to also endorse the HTLC unless they have a compelling reason not to. However, this chain of trust breaks down if any node along the path has reasons to doubt the swift resolution of the HTLC, leading them to potentially drop the endorsement.
Furthermore, the discussion explores the potential for source nodes to make more informed endorsements by leveraging complete payment lifecycle data, assuming route blinding is not a factor. Nonetheless, this approach does not address the fundamental issue that both B and C (and by extension, all intermediary nodes) lack sufficient information to accurately predict HTLC resolution times, making it nearly impossible to correlate endorsements with actual outcomes effectively. This scenario underscores a broader skepticism regarding the feasibility of linking endorsements to the probability of timely resolution, given the inherent information asymmetry between endorsers and forwarders.
In essence, the conversation challenges the efficacy of relying on reputation and endorsements within the HTLC framework, especially when endorsers often know less than or are equally uninformed as forwarders about critical factors influencing HTLC resolution. This critique invites a reevaluation of how trust and information are managed and utilized within the network to mitigate risks associated with delayed resolutions and other operational inefficiencies.